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COMMENTS
CUSTOM S-CRIMEs-LIENS-PRIORITY OF CHATTEL MORTGAGE OVER LIEN
FOR VIOLATION OF AIR COMMERCE REGULATIONS.-[Federal] The owner of
an airplane flew it from Mexico to an airport in the United States without
giving prior notice to the appropriate Collector of Customs and without
making his first landing at an official airport of entry-all in violation of
the Air Commerce .Act and the Regulations thereunder.' The plane was
subject to a valid chattel mortgage in favor of the intervenor (Batre), who
had no notice of this breach of the law and regulations. The United States
filed a libel against the plane to enforce the statutory lien for the penalty
provided for such violations. The District Court for Arizona held that the
intervenor's mortgage-lien was prior to the statutory penalty-lien. 2  On
appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, it was held, that the statutory lien
was prior to that of the mortgage. United States v. Batre, 69 F. (2d) 673
(C. C. A. 9th, March 12, 1934).
The Circuit Court reasoned that the usual rule of construction against
penalties was subject to an exception in favor of revenue laws3 and that
to permit the mortgage to obtain a priority would result in evasions of the
law, since an owner could mortgage his plane beyond its sale value and thus
escape the infliction of any penalty.4 The result reached is that which ob-
tains under the general admiralty laws in similar cases 5 and under the
revenue provisions of the liquor laws-it having taken express legislation
7
to protect the mortgagees against forfeiture under the Prohibition Laws.
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
1. Act of May 20, 1926, c. 344, §§7.(b) and 11(b), 44 Stat. at L. 568,
572 and 574, 49 U. S. C. §§177(b) and 181(b) ; Foreign Air Commerce Reg.
of Nov. 5, 1930, 1930 U. S. Av. Rep. 378; Aircraft Customs Reg. of Jan. 3,
1929, 1929 U. S. Av. Rep. 267 ; Airports of Entry Reg. of Nov. 1, 1931, 1932
U. S. Av. Rep. 295.
2. United States v. One Waco Bt-plane, 1933 U. S. Av. Rep. 159 (D. C.
Ariz. 1932), discussed in 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, 153 (1934).
3. Citing: United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S. 1, 12, 10 Sup. Ct. 244, 246,
33 L. Ed. 555, 558 (1890).
4. "If the penalty is incapable of enforcement, which is the result if the
decision of the lower court Is affirmed, then this provision affords no aid in
preventing violation of the law. It can readily be seen that if a lien created
by a chattel mortgage is held superior to this penalty lien those so disposed
can always evade it by mortgaging the airplane up to or beyond its actual
value, with the result that the government could neVer collect the penalty and
the law would be without force. Its object would not be accomplished."
69 F. (2d) 673, 675.
5. Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210, 11 L. Ed. 239 (U. S. 1844)
United States v. The Schooner Little Charles, Fed. Cas. No. 15,612 (D. C.
N. Y. 1818) ; Boggs v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. 993 (1882).
6. Lindsley v. Werner, 86 Colo. 545, 283 P. 534 (1929) ; consult an ex-
haustive collection of the cases on this point in, Note, 47 A. L. R. 1055 (1926).
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute resulting in for-
feiture of an Innocent owner's interest in Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465,
47 Sup. Ct. 133, 71 L. Ed. 354, 47 A. L. R. 1044 (1926).
7. Act of Oct 28, 1919, c 85, 41 Stat at L. 305, 315, 27 U. S. C. 140;
for a collection of the state statutes consult Note. 47 A. L. R 1055, 1064 (1926).
[495]
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NEGLIGENCE-AIRPORT COLLISION-REs IPSA LouuITR.- [Washington]
The defendant, wishing to start the motor of his plane, made the necessary
adjustments in the cockpit, then went forward to crank the motor. He
failed, however, to put chocks under the wheels. Upon turning the pro-
peller, the motor started, idling slowly, then, through some unexplained
cause, the throttle opened-causing the engine to speed up. Before the
defendant could board the plane it got away and, with no one at the con-
trols, struck the plaintiff's hangar, bursting into flames which destroyed
both the hangar and the plane. Plaintiff relied on the rule of res ipsa
loquitur. The trial court was of the opinion that the rule was inapplicable,
because, at all events, while an inference of negligence might arise from
the circumstances, the defendant was entitled to rebut it, and the evidence
showed that he used such care as a careful pilot would have used under
similar circumstances. Accordingly, judgment was for the defendant, from
which this appeal is taken. Held, that the judgment should be affirmed.
Although the court spoke favorably of the applicability of the doctrine of
res ipsa, it was of the opinion that a reversal was unwarranted under the
evidence. Genero v. Ewing, 28 P. (2d) 116 (Wash. 1934).
In the United States, there are said to be three rules of liability ap-
plicable to damages caused by aircraft on the surface.1 Section 5 of the
Uniform State Law of Aeronautics provides, in effect, for absolute liability
in every case of injury to person or property, the only available defense
being that of contributory negligence. 2 In some jurisdictions a similar rule
of absolute liability has been adopted, but with the defense of vis major
available.3 Still other jurisdictions apply the ordinary rules of negligence as
applied generally to torts on land.4
The following principal arguments are advanced as a justification for
the rule of absolute liability: (1) That in most cases, persons on land
are helpless to avoid injury from aircraft; (2) that the airplane is inherent-
ly dangerous; (3) that, as a practical matter, it is impossible for the
injured person to prove the cause of the accident.5 With respect to the in-
ability of a person to avoid injury from an airplane, it may well be asked
whether it is greater, to any marked degree, than his inability to avoid
injury from an uncontrolled automobile? The injury appears to be just as
unavoidable in the case of an automobile which is out of control by reason
of a defective steering gear or brakes, as it is from an airplane. With the
modern developments in landing facilities, beacons and radio beams, in-
1. Kingsley, Robert, and Gates, Sam E., "Liability to Persons and Prop-
erty on the Ground," 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 515 (1933) ; Kaftal, Andre, "The
Problem of Liability for Damages Caused by Aircraft on the Surface," 5
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 179 (1934).
2. This rule has been adopted by more than one-third of the States. Theprinciple of absolute liability is based upon the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,
L. R.. 3 H. L. 330 (1868). Newman. Arthur L. II, "Damage Liability in
Aircraft Cases." 29 Col. L. Rev. 1039 (1929); Note, 47 Harv. L Rev. 345
(1933).
3. MacCrackcen, Vm. P., Jr.. "Air Law," 57 Am. L. Rev. 97 (1923)
Zollmann, Carl, "Law of the Air" (1927), c. 3.
4. Greunke v. North American Airways Co., 201 Wis. 565, 230 N. W. 618,
69 A. L. R. 295, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 126 (1930), discussed in 1 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 363 (1930); Wilson V. Colonial Air Transport, 278 Mass. 420, 180 N. E.
212, 81 A. L. R. 329. 1932 I. S. Av. R. 139 (1932): Read v. N. Y. City Airport.
145 Misc. 294, 259 N. Y. S. 245, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 31 (1932); Hearne, "Lia-
bility of Aviator for Damage to Persons and Property," 37 W. Va. L. Quar. 269(1931).
5. Baldwin. S. E., "Liability for Accidents in Aerial" Navigation," 9 Mich.
L. Rev. 20 (1910): Newman. Arthur L.. I, "Damage Liability in Aircraft
Cases," 29 Col. L. Rev. 1039 (1929): 56 Rep. Am. Bar Assn. 88-89 (1931).
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juries occasioned by aircraft generally will be confined to cases where the
airplane is out of control by reason of some defective mechanism. The
radio beam has successfull demonstrated that a plane may be kept on its
course and landed safely, even though the pilot's vision is totally obscured.6
It cannot be said that an airplane is inherently more dangerous than an
automobile or train. In either case, assuming due care in operation, the
danger is negligible so long as the mechanisms function properly. As to the
practical inability of the injured person to show the cause of the accident,
it has been suggested that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a complete
answer.
7
The theory of res ipsa loquitur has been well stated in the case of
Smith v. O'Donnell,8 wherein the court said: "The foundation or reason
for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is based upon probabilities and con-
venience. When it is shown that the occurrence is such as does not ordi-
narily happen without negligence on the part of those in charge of the in-
strumentality, and that the thing which occasioned the injury was in charge
of the party sought to be charged, the law operating upon the probabilities
and the theory that if there was no negligence the defendant can then most
conveniently prove it raises a presumption of negligence which the de-
fendant must overcome by proof that there was in fact no negligence."
The essential elements appear to be: (1) That the accident is such as does
not ordinarily happen in the absence of negligence; (2) that the instrument
was under the exclusive control of the party sought to be charged.9 It
is apparent that the doctrine was applicable to the facts of the principal case.
In the principal case, the trial court apparently gave such weight to
the inference of negligence arising from the unexplained failure of the
mechanism as it thought was warranted, and reached the conclusion that
the defendant was not negligent. Assuming that the plaintiff had been able
to prove that this particular defect in the throttle mechanism was commonly
found in all other planes of the same manufacture then, clearly, the evidence
would have been insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence arising
from the circumstances, i. e., the failure of the defendant to place chocks
under the wheels or to have someone in the cockpit to control the plane
after the motor started; since, in such case, the defendant would be charge-
able with constructive, if not actual noticeI0 of this particular defective
6. Doolittle, James H.. "Recent Developments in Air Transportation," 5
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 240 (1934).
7. Schneider, Joseph, "Negligence in the Law of Aviation," 12 Boston
U. L. Rev. 17 (1932) ; Kingsley, Robert, and Gates, Sam V., "Liability to Per-
sons and Property on the Ground," 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 515 (1933).
8. 67 Cal. App. Dec. 838, 842, 5 P. (2d) 690, 695 (1931), opinion adopted
in 215 Cal. 714, 12 P. (2d) 933 (1932), discussed in 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
463 (1932), and 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 429 (1933).
9. Stoll v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., 1930 U. S. Av. R. 148, affd., 236
App. Div. 664, 257 N. Y. S. 1010, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 163 (1932); Seaman
v. Curtiss Plying Service, Inc., 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N. Y. S. 251, 1931
U. S. Av. R. 227 (1930); see Sollak v. State, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 42, 43(N. Y. 1927) ; of. Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., 1931 U. S. Av. R.
109 (1931), affd.. 278 Mass. 420, 180 N. E. 212, 83 A. L. R. 329, 1.932 U. S.
Av. R. 139 (1932) ; Carpenter, Charles E., "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur,"
1 Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. 519, 520 (1934).
10. Cf. Martin v. Maxwell-Brisco Motor Vehicle Co., 158 Mo. App. 188.
138 S. W. 65 (1911), where the plaintiff, being unaware of the danger in-
volved, was permitted to recover for injuries received in cranking defendant's
car. After a showing of the danger involved in cranking the car, the court
held that defendant was chargeable with notice of such danger, and in the
exercise of due care, should have notified plaintiff thereof; Allen v. Schultz,
107 Wash. 393. 181 P. 916. 6 A. L. R. 676 (1919), in which an accident re-
sulted from defective brakes and the court stated: "One who operates on the
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mechanism and should, therefore, have taken added precautions. Had such
common defect been susceptible of proof, then, under the doctrine of judi-
cial notice," it would have been a proper matter to be noticed by the court.
The same result would have been reached if the court, in lieu of proof,
had taken notice of said common defect. In this respect, it is suggested
that, in the past, certain types of planes were known to have common
defects.12
Thus far, the courts have been willing to take judicial notice of the
general,13 but not the particular,14 characteristics of aircraft. Undoubtedly,
judicial notice will come to play as important a part in the field of aero-
nautics as it has in relation to automobiles and other common
mechanisms.15
CHARLES T. SMITH.
NEGLIGENCE-MID-AIR COLLISION-DEGREE OF CARE-MASTER AND SER-
VANT.-[Illinois] Plaintiff, in an action on the case, sought to recover
damages of ten thousand dollars for the death of his wife following a
mid-air collision between defendant's plane in which his wife was riding
and another plane. The facts of the case were stipulated and show that
plaintiff and defendant were brothers-in-law and that, for a considerable
period, an arrangement had existed whereby plaintiff might use defendant's
plane (a Stearman plane, duly licensed) on condition that said plane should
streets of a city such a dangerous instrumentality as an automobile is bound
to take notice that he may be called upon to make emergency stops, and it Is
negligence on his part not to keep the automobile in such condition that such
stops are possible." Thus, it is seen that the operator of an instrumentality
having a known defect is chargeable with knowledge thereof and, therefore,
must take additional precautions.
11. Scientific facts of common recognition among the people with whose
affairs the court is dealing are freauently the subject of judicial notice. "In
the exercise of the function of judicial notice, the courts simply reflect the
state of the times, and progress with the progress of the people." McKelvey,
on Evidence (4th ed. 1932), 46 and 47, §30; 5 Wigmore, on Evidence (2nd ed.
1923). 579 §2571.
12. For example: The old army training planes (J. N. 4 D.) apparently
had defective throttles, which were apt to slip open unless someone was in
the cockpit to guard against such contingency; the Thomas-More scout planes
of the past were known to have very weak and defective wing structures; dur-
ing the World War, it was common knowledge that the Nieuport combat planes
were apt to catch fire at any time because of defective carburetion systems,
13. Platt v. Erie County Aeric. Soc., 164 ApD. Div. 99, 149 N. Y. S, 520.
1928 U. S. Av. R. 116 (1914) ; Hesse v. Rath, 224 App. Div. 344, 230 N. Y. S.
676, affd., 249 N. Y. 436, 164 N. E. 342, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 315 (1928) ; Smith
v. New England Aircraft Co.. 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385, 1930 U. S. Av.
R. 1 (1930) ; Note, 69 A. L. R. 338 (1930).
14. Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, 278 Mass. 420, 180 N. E. 212, 83
A. L. R. 329, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 139 (1932), in which the court was of the
opinion that aviation had not yet reached the stage where the court would
take Judicial notice of facts relating to the mechanics thereof because there
was no common knowledge and experience upon which such an inference
could be based. Such particular facts In relation to automobiles and other
common mechanisms are constantly being noticed by the courts. Cf. Seligman
v. Hammond. 205 Wis. 199, 236 N. W. 115 (1931), in which the court judicially
noticed that a blow-out on the left front wheel would cause the car to swerve
to the left; Wener v. Pope, 209 Ky. 553, 273 S. W. 92 (1925), in which the
court took Judicial notice of the speed at which an automobile must be operated
in order to stop within a specifled distance: Cook v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.. 51
S. W. (2d) 171 Mo." ApD. (1932), in which the court took Judicial notice that
the angle spread of good headlights on a car extend laterally.
15. Courts will take judicial notice of whatever Is common and current
knowledge concerning automobiles, such as their particular characteristics;
their mode of operation; their increasing numbers and the consequent danger
therefrom; their capacity for speed: their ease of control: and the effect of
traffic and weather conditions on the safety of operation, 15-16 Huddy, En-
cyclopedia of Automobile Law (9th ed. 1931), 272, §152, and cases cited therein;
2 Blashfteld. Cyclopedia of Automobile Law (1927), 1695, and cases cited
therein.
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be piloted by one Walter Meyer (a licensed pilot of 3600 hours experience)
employed by the defendant to fly the plane for him. On the day in question,
the plane was flown by Meyer and collided with an unlicensed plane in the
vicinity of Sky Harbor Airport. The trial court, without a jury, found for
the defendant. Upon appeal, affirmed. Bird v. Louer, 272 Ill. App. 522.
The basis on which plaintiff rested his case was that Meyer, the pilot-of
defendant's plane, had conducted himself so carelessly, negligently, and un-
skillfully that the collision took place and plaintiff's wife was killed. The
collision occurred at about 6 P. M. on a clear day at an altitude of between
600-1000 feet. The following stipulated facts are of particular interest:
"The Louer plane (defendant's) was visible to the pilot (unlicensed) of the
Standard (also unlicensed), who apparently seemed to make a turn to avoid
the collision but made a flat turn so that he skidded and the right wing
of the Standard hit the right wing of the Louer plane. . . The visi-
bility in the Stearman plane is better than in most ships, probably as good
as any, but there is a blind spot directly ahead so that when the airplane
is in normal flight the pilot cannot see a ship which is close in front of
him, if it is exactly at the same altitude of his ship. The ship however
could be maneuvered to give visibility in any direction."' While it was
agreed that Mrs. Bird, the deceased, had never taken flying lessons, it was
stipulated that it was not known who was actually operating the Stearman
plane (possessing dual controls) at the time of the collision.
The decision of the court was based on the following controlling ques-
tions: (1) Was Meyer when flying the airplane the agent or servant of
the defendant, and acting within the scope of his employment, or, as de-
fendant contended, the agent and servant of Bird, in which latter case
the rule of respondeat superior would not be applicable and defendant as
a matter of law not liable? The situation inferred from the facts in the
present case was that defendant loaned-his servant to plaintiff for a spe-
cial service subject to the direction of plaintiff, who however did not have
either the power or the right to discharge Meyer. The court held that
the right to discharge being essential to the relationship of master and
servant, Meyer was not the servant of Bird but at the time was still the
servant of defendant Louer and the rule of respondeat superior was there-
fore applicable. The court did not specifically decide whether or not Meyer
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time the accident
occurred. (2) Was defendant or his pilot Meyer guilty of negligence
which was the proximate cause of the collision? Since the trial court found
for the defendant on this issue, and that finding was entitled to the same
weight as averdict of a jury, the ultimate question for the determination
of the court was whether that finding was clearly and manifestly against
the weight of the evidence. In view of the court's holding on question (1)
that Meyer was the servant or agent of defendant, then (a) Mrs. Bird was
in defendant's plane either as an invitee or a passenger for hire and (b)
defendant owed a duty to transport her with reasonable care. The court
discarded plaintiff's contention that, since Meyer was an extraordinarily skill-
ful and experienced pilot flying a maneuverable ship of latest design and
in good condition on a clear day with perfect visibility over a public airport
where other ships were likely to be maneuvering and where he had unlimited
1. Italics ours.
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area for his own maneuvers, and, since, if he had been looking, he could
have seen the other plane for a distance of miles and could have at any
time for a period of minutes rather than seconds changed his line of flight
so that it would have been impossible for the other plane to approach
him, much less collide with his plane, it was therefore extreme negligence
on Meyer's part to permit his plane to collide with the other, thereby caus-
ing the death of Mrs. Bird. The court indulged the presumption that it
was Meyer who was at the controls at the time of impact, but refused
to "indulge the presumption that because Meyer was extraordinarily capable
he therefore must have been entirely negligent." In the absence of direct
evidence, the court presumed the contrary, and indulged the presumption
that "the planes may have come into an air pocket or may have experienced
sudden gusts of wind or may have suffered motor defects at that moment."
Finally, the court leaned on the reputed ignorance and inefficiency of the
other pilot, his failure to bank on the turn thereby causing him to skid
into defendant's plane, and on the fact that defendant's plane had a blind
spot directly ahead in horizontal flight and held that "from the undisputed
facts the proximate and immediate cause of the collision . . . was the
negligence and inefficiency of the pilot of the Standard plane, and that there
is no evidence from which an inference may be reasonably drawn that
Meyer was negligent."
The foregoing statement of facts and opinion demonstrates that if
we are to have any symmetrical development of air law, it is hopeless to
thrust on a court the duty of fixing responsibility for an accident of this
kind-particularly where the evidence is so sketchy. On the basis of the
facts as they were stipulated, the court's use of legal doctrine is probably
unassailable. The court correctly held that Meyer was the servant of the
defendant but might well have decided on the merits of the case that Meyer
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
The court, however, found it unnecessary to specifically decide this point
since its decision was based on the lack of negligence on the part of Meyer.
Likewise, the court did not specifically define the status of defendant's
plane as a private carrier, nor the status of Mrs. Bird as an invitee or
passenger for hire-holding that, even were she carried gratuitously, de-
fendant was obliged (as in automobile cases) to use reasonable care. The
distinction between degrees of care was thus avoided. The court might
easily have admitted the tenuity of these distinctions relative to aviation
cases since any lack of care in flying is likely to be disastrous, and there
is scant opportunity to determine what degree of care was, or was not,
employed in a given situation.
In its handling of the instant case, the court maintained a safe balance
in its use of legal doctrine. It must also be conceded that, from the facts
stipulated, plaintiff fell short in proving that defendant's pilot was negligent
and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. It is
submitted, however, that the facts as stipulated were so warped by their
reduction from highly technical combinations of fact into terms suitable
for consideration by what must be termed in this case a lay agency (the
court) that the court seems to have been led into going too far afield from
the facts for its ultimate conclusions, that (1) Meyer. was not negligent in
failing to see the other plane; (2) the planes may have (a) come into an
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air pocket or (b) experienced sudden gusts of wind or (c) encountered
some defect in the motor; (3) the "skidding" of the Standard plane was
the cause of the accident. The court was undoubtedly misled into placing
undue emphasis on the fact that Meyer was unable to see the other plane
because of a "blind spot" in the Stearman at the moment of collision. The
guilelessness of the court is hardly to be wondered at, since the facts were
stipulated by experts. It is submitted that had the testimony of the wit-
nesses and various technical data on the collision been subjected to the
scrutiny and consideration of a body of experts, the results of at least
these above stated conclusions would have been far different.
The judgment of experts would have recognized the "air pocket" myth
at once. And while "a sudden gust of wind" may throw together planes
flying in close formation, such has never been known to cause a collision
between planes flying according to the federal air traffic rules-with a mini-
mum of 300 feet between them. The "blind spot" idea is plausible, but
anyone familiar with aircraft knows full well that there are possibly more
"blind spots" than "visible spots" and that every pilot is fully aware of the
visibility limitations of his craft.2 The controls of an aircraft are not dif-
ficult to manipulate and "blind spots" can be made visible with very little
effort. Thus, while it is fully admitted that the court here had a most
unsatisfactory case to deal with,_ from the standpoint of the evidence avail-
able, it is to be hoped that no one will read into this decision an idea that,
because of "blind spots" a pilot need never maneuver his ship a little bit
just to look.
LORRAINE ARNOLD.
2. "Anyone reasonably informed on aeronautical history can recollect sev-
eral instances of airplane collisions that resulted disastrously despite the
very small number of ships In the air at those times. Pilots well known for
their experience, capabilities, and conservatism have frequently figured in these
collisions. With these facts in mind, together with the probability that we
shall presently witness very rapid increases in the number of light planes-
piloted by Inexperienced and often careless pleasure seekers-the dangers due
to inadequate visibility may be seen in their true magnitude. . . . It must
be conceded that visibility from the pilot's seats of practically all ships that have
been flown has been adeouate so long as their pilots have been alert and on
the job. The narrative of an air collision usually Is the story of two pilots
momentarily 'caught napping.' . . . Let us first of all renounce
[a] theory, nursed by many, that all airplane collisions are the result of
inadequate visibility in the participating planes. There are, In fact, three
distinct possibilities in this connection. Two ships may meet within the ranges
of vision of the two pilots, both temporarily distracted from their directions
of travel. Or the pilot of the approaching plane may be 'blinded' and the
second pilot unobservant. In the third instance, the two ships may collide
within their respective blind angle ranges while their pilots are fully covering
their individual flight paths, yet without thought of the possibilities of blind
angle approaches. The first type of accident can never be eliminated entirely.
Even roller skates are 'blind' to the user who prefers to look In a direction
other than the one In which he is traveling. In all probabilities, however, the
large majority of air collisions thus far fall within the two latter classifications.
Taking into consideration the many varied types of ships and the multiplicity
of air maneuvers, together with important variables such as relative speeds
and directions of both planes and air currents, the large number of possible
collision combinations with present day planes, becomes apjjarent": Huntington,
Dwight. "Adequate Visibility for Planes," 18 Aero Dig. 52 (June, 1931).
The same writer finds that there are two classes of responsibility: (1)
Where the pilot of one or the other ship maneuvers into the other ship (that
Is, where he could have seen had he been looking). (2) Where the pilot falls
to notice the approach of the other ship (that Is, where he was prevented from
seeing because of a blind spot at that particular angle).
The suggestion Is made by the same writer that In the instance of planes
approaching from the opposite direction, the honors may well be divided
evenly. That appears to have been the situation in the present case and the
conclusion follows Inevitably that it Is futile to set a court the duty of deter-
mining the negligence of two pilots involved in a mid-air collision.
THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
DIGESTS
AIRPORTS-CONTRACT OF LEASE FOR MUNICIPAL PORT.--.[Ohio] The City
of Toledo entered into a written lease in 1927 with the National Supply
Company by which the city acquired certain premises to be used as an air-
port for a term of three years at a fixed annual rental, payable in quarterly
installments, the lease to expire June 30, 1930, but lessee to have the option
of renewing upon like terms and condition for an additional period of one
year provided written notice be given the lessor at least ninety days prior
to the expiration of the original term. Upon expiration there was no
renewal of the lease, but the City of Toledo continued to use the premises
for airport purpose for exactly three months after the expiration of the
term of the written lease. The City paid all of the rental during the three-
year period and tendered payment of the rental for the three-month period
at the rate of one-fourth of the annual rental. Tender was refused by the
National Supply Company which brought suit to recover the sum of a
whole year's rental plus taxes and penalty which became due and payable
during said yearly period. Judgment in the lower court was for the full
amount claimed, which the City of Toledo sought to reverse, on the grounds
that there was no express contract for the rental of the premises in ques-
tion and that the law will not imply a contract. Plaintiff in error contended
further that the original written lease was absolutely void because the pro-
visions of the statute were not complied with, in that no certificate was
placed on file, and that there is no implied municipal liability in matters
ex contractu. Held, the doctrine that a contract will not be implied against
a city applies to a contract of lease as well as any other contract, and the
City of Toledo was therefore not liable for either the amount claimed or
the amount tendered. However, as the City of Toledo was willing to makegood its tender for the three-month period, the court entered judgment in
favor of the National Supply Company for that amount, with the pro. iso
that plaintiff was to pay all costs, the tender having been made before suit
was instituted. Judgment modified accordingly and as modified affirmed.
City of Toledo v. National Supply Co., Ohio Court of Appeals, January 22,
1934. 234 C.C.H. 3027.
LORRAINE ARNOLD.
AIRPORTS-RIGHT OF COUNTY TO LEASE LAND FOR MUNICIPAL AIRPORT-
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS-ExPENDITURE OF PUBLIC FUNDS.-[Ohio] The com-
missioners of a county desired authority to expend public funds for theleasing of land near village A to be used as an aviation landing field and
to be improved through the use of CWA iunds. A board of county com-
missioners, being purely a creature of statute has only such powers as are
expressly conferred upon it by statute, and such implied I.owers as are
necessary to carry into effect such express powers. The Constitution of
Ohio provides that no money shall be withdrawn from any county or town-
ship treasury, except by authority of law. In a previous opinion of theAttorney General, it was therefore held that a board of county commis-
sioners, not being authorized by statute so to do, may not lawfully purchase
land to be used as an airport and may not issue bonds for such purpose;
and this was held to be decisive of the present case involving the lease ofland. In addition, the General Code of Ohio has a specific provision for
the purchase or condemnation of land necessary for landing fields for air-
craft and transportation terminals, and it was held to follow that, since thelegislature has not expressly given the county commissioners authority tb
purchase or lease lands for landing fields for aircraft, such authority does
not exist. It is therefore held that a board of county commissioners. has
no authority to expend public funds for the leasing of a landing field.Opinion of the Attorney General of Ohio, January 29, 1934, 234 C.C.H. 3028.
LORRAINE ARNOLD.
NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
COMMISSIONS-APPROPRIATION FOR AIR SERVICE BUILDING COMMISSION.-
[Alabama] "The legislature of Alabama passed an act which was approved
on July 2. 1931, General Acts of Alabama, Regular Session 1931, page 402,
providing for the creation of a commission to be known as Alabama Air
Service Building Commission. The act authorizes the Commission to con-
struct certain buildings and improvements. The act makes an appropriation
to pay for said buildings. Section 19 of the Act provides that the Com-
mission shall have power and authority to borrow money in anticipation
of the amount of the appropriation becoming available, and to pledge the
appropriation as security for the payment of the loan. Section 21 of the
Act, being the section which makes the appropriation, was amended in the
Special Session of 1932 (see General Acts of Alabama, Extra Session 1932,
page 298). Under the terms and provisions of this Act, can the Alabama
Air Service Building Commission borrow from the Federal Government
under the Federal Emergency Appropriation for Public Works and pledge
the appropriation for the repayment of the loan? If an application is made
for a loan by the Alabama Air Service Building Commission, and approved
by me as Governor, will such loan be in violation of section 213 of the
Constitution of Alabama as amended by a vote of the people on July 18,
1933, the amendment being made a part of the Constitution by proclamation
dated August 2, 1933? If a loan is made to the Alabama Air Service Build-
ing Commission, can the loan be repaid without a violation of any of the
provisions of the budget law? Can such loan be made and repaid without
offending any part of section 213 of the Constitution as amended by Gov-
ernor's proclamation dated August 2, 1933?"
Held, "the Air Service Commission Act expressly authorizes the com-
mission to borrow money for construction purposes and to pledge the ap-
propriation for the payment of such loan. This is within the authority of
the Legislature, but subject to constitutional limitations affecting such ap-
propriation, or the amount that may become available thereunder. The
recent constitutional amendment (Gen. Acts 1933, Ex. Sess., p. 196), known
as the McDaniel Amendment, amending section 213 of the Constitution for
the purpose of validating a floating debt heretofore incurred under appro-
priations in excess of revenues, incorporated provisions expressly intended
to prevent future deficits in the state treasury. To this end available funds
for the payment of claims, in case of a deficit, are to be prorated, and all
excess unpaid appropriations are declared null and void. We would not
anticipate the questions that may arise touching the claims included in such
prorate, nor what appropriations, if any, are without such provision because
of other constitutional provisions. Suffice to say, we find nothing to except
the appropriation in question from the operation of section 213 as thus
amended. Whatever effect be given to sections 20 and 22 of the Fletcher
Bill (Gen. Acts 1932, Ex. Sess., p. 35), touching permanent constructions,
or capital projects, we find nothing in amended section 213, which will
permit the Legislature to give preference thereto by setting apart or di-
recting you to set apart from the general funds in the treasury such sums
as may be required to meet them in full, and thus deplete the funds avail-
able to meet the current operations of the several departments or state
institutions, who must take on a pro rata basis. We conclude the appro-
priation in question is subject to amended section 213." In re Opinions of the
Justices, 149 So. 775.
F. D. F.
INSURANcE-AcTION By AGENT FOR Loss OF CoMMISSIONS.-[New York]
Plaintiff, an assignee of an insurance agent, sought recovery of damages for
breach of contract of employment. Plaintiff's assignor was employed by a
firm of general agents of the defendant to solicit life insurance, and said
defendant had issued a circular offering a special policy eliminating avia-
tion risks from coverage. Plaintiff's assignor secured an application for a
twenty-year endowment policy with the aviation risk excluded and the pay-
ment of the first quarterly premium. The defendant rejected the applica-
tion on the ground that it had decided not to insure airplane owners. Held,
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for plaintiff, on the ground that where the agent had procured an applica-
tion by a good insurable risk for life insurance with the aviation risk ex-
cluded, insurer was liable to the agent's assignee for the full commission,
where the applicant's expectancy exceeded the period during which the
commission was payable. Johnson v. National Life Ins. Co., 268 N. Y. S. 495
(Supreme Court, New York County). F. D. F.
INSURANCE-PARTICIPATION IN AVIATION OPERATIONs.--[Arkansas] Ap-
peal prosecuted from a judgment against appellant insurance company in
favor of appellee, the beneficiary in an accident policy for double indemnity
alleged to be due under the terms of the policy. The insured paid no fare
and was killed when the plane crashed. The insurance policy provided that
the double indemnity should not'be payable in case death resulted from
.participation in aviation operations." Held, judgment for plaintiff affirmed,
and rehearing denied. There was no contractual relation between the pilot
of the plane and the insured and no expectation of a fare to be paid and
collected for the trip, the insured being an invited guest only and not a
passenger, and it cannot be said that insured received the injuries from
which he died "from participation in aviation operations," within the mean-
ing of the terms of the policy, and is thereby excluded from its coverage.
The effect of the word "operations" in connection with the phrase "par-
ticipation in aviation" necessarily limits the scope of the meaning of the
word "participation," and, though the word "participate," standing alone,
might denote activities not included in the narrow compass of "engaged in"
when the effect of the word "operations" is considered (which can only
mean the management and control of the airplane), it becomes more ap-
parent that "participation" is to be considered in its active sense and
viewed as the equivalent of "engaged in."* Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v.
Martin, 69 S. W. (2d) 1081 (Supreme Court of Arkansas).
F. D. F.
INSURANcE-ENGAGING IN AERONAUTICS AS PASSENGER OR OTHERWISE IN
AERONAUTIC OPERATIONS.-[Federal] A passenger in an airplane was killed
as a result of a plane crash and recovery of double indemnity was sought.
Double indemnity was not payable if the insured's death resulted "from
engaging, as a passenger or otherwise, in submarine or aeronautic opera-
tions." Held, for defendant, by affirming a decree dismissing the bill for
want of equity. This on the ground that the double indemnity clause ex-
cluded from coverage death resulting from engaging in a single trip in an
airplane as a passenger.f Goldsmith v. New York Life Ins. Co., 69 F. (2d)
273 (U. S. C. C. A. 8th, Missouri).
Petition for writ of certiorari denied by the United States Supreme
Court, May 28, 1934. 234 C.C.H. 3095.
F. D. F.
INSURANCE-FIRE POLICv-OWNERSHIP.-[Pennsylvania] Insured was a
pilot, and the president of an amusement company advanced the money with
which to purchase the airplane to be used to carry passengers in the amuse-
ment park. The bill of sale was first made out to the president of the
amusement company but was changed to show the pilot as buyer. It was
then recorded with the Federal Department of Commerce, and the registra-
tion card, carried in the plane, contained the insured's name. Held, that
proof showed the insured to be the owner and therefore had an insurable
interest in the plane entitling him to recover on a fire insurance policy for
loss of the plane by fire. The fact that the employer paid for the plane
was not conclusive that it was not owned by the employee so as to entitle
*See dissent by Smith, J.,. p. 1086.
tSee dissent by Stone, J., p. 276.
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the latter to recover on the fire policy, taken in his name. Newman v. North.
River Ins. Co., 171 A. 601 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania).
F. D. F.
NEGLIGENCE-AIRPORT COLLISION-MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE.-[Georgia] An
ordinance of the City of Atlanta prohibits the leaving of any aircraft-
with motors running-on the city airport unless the pilot or mechanic is
therein. Plaintiff left his plane with defendant to be mechanically tested
and, after a test flight, defendant's servant started the motor without plac-
ing chock blocks at the wheels or otherwise securing it. The plane ran
across the field and crashed into other planes on the field and caused con-
siderable damage to plaintiff's plane. Held, that the jury were authorized
to find a violation of the city ordinance, and that the violation constituted
negligence. The ordinance was reasonable and the court did not err in
charging the jury that a violation of same would constitute negligence per
se, nor in admitting the ordinance in evidence. Since there was no allega-
tion or evidence to show that the plane could not have been made secure,
the servant's act was not excusable on the ground that he was afraid that
the plane would cause an accident unless removed immediately. Judgment
for plaintiff, affirmed. T. A. T. Flying Service, Inc. v. Adamson, 169 S. E.
851 (Ct. of Appeals of Georgia, Div. No. 8).
LORRAINE ARNOI D.
NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-COLLISION WITH HAYRAKE ON
RUNWAY-ORDINARY CARE.-[Wisconsin] Action by plaintiff to recover for
damages to his airplane which were sustained in alighting on a hayrake,
which defendant had permitted to be on its landing field. On the trial the
jury returned a special verdict that defendant's negligence in permitting the
rake to be left on the field was a cause of plaintiff's damage, and that
plaintiff's pilot did not fail to exercise ordinary care in respect to attempt-
ing to land on an unlighted field or in respect to keeping a proper lookout
for objects on the field. Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and defendant
appealed.
Held, reversed and remanded. Plaintiff's pilot was under a duty to
exercise ordinary care in the operation and control of the airplane; and,
in the case of airplane operation, ordinary care requires that the pilot is
not to land until he has seen that he has a clear place on which to land,
and safe piloting requires that he make as many turns as possible before
landing so as to be able to see what is on the ground below. In the present
case, plaintiff's pilot failed to circle the field more than once and was so
blinded by the setting sun that he landed on the hayrake which was stand-
ing on the landing runway. The court held that the pilot was negligent
as a matter of law, if he so proceeded to land, voluntarily, at a time when
he was unable, because his vision was obscured, to see the rake, which
otherwise would have been visible from his position in the airplane. In
order to be free from contributory negligence plaintiff's pilot should have
continued to circle about the field until he had a sufficient lookout to ascer-
tain whether the field was clear. His negligence in so alighting without
exercising this ordinary care so qontributed to the collision as to defeat
plaintiff's right to recover. Davies v. Oshkosh Airport, 252 N. W. 602
(Supreme Court of Wisconsin).
